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Historiography, Criticality and
Architectural Criticism
Criticism is always an affront, and its only justification
lies in its usefulness, in making its object available to just
response.'
We are now emerging from a hyper-theorised, hyper-eritical
episode in architecture. Whether you call it deconstruction,
postmodernism, or some other thing, it was a period when archi-
tectural discourse and academe spun off on a self-referential
tangent that often seemed to bear little relation to architectural
practice. This was a moment dominated by North American
academics and schools of thought, and Diane Ghirardo has
described the years between 1970 and 2000 as 'three decades
of theoretical delirium in which poeticising reflection passed
for theory ... thirty years of trying on and discarding borrowed
theories with all the rapidity of a commodified consumer at an
outlet sale'. 2 Within all this, it seems fair to say that the influence
of Peter Eisenman was ever-present. For him, architecture was
(and indeed continues to be) inextricably tied to philosophy via
deconstruction, and inextricably tied to criticism through the
concepts of autonomy and resistance. He argues that there is a
'possible inherent criticality that is unique to architecture', where
'criticality can be understood as the striving or the will to perform
or manifest architecture's outonorny'." Eisenman's concern is
nothing less than the 'survival of the discipline' of architecture per
se. Such criticism embodies a resistance to or a negation of com-
modity culture, and is thus the late inheritor of a Marxist-inflected,
Frankfurt-school cultural critique. During the height of this time,
the prefix 'critical' took on a talismanic character; employed as a
kind of charm, it was used to both pre-empt and ward off a whole
range of (sometimes contradictory) accusations: of commodifica-
tion, of irrelevance, of empty formal experimentation, of the
submission to spectacle and fashion, and so on. But if this once-
dominant position can be described as 'criticality' (or 'critical
architecture', these terms will be used interchangeably throughout
this essay), it has been explicitly challenged, in recent years,
by the new guard of the 'post-eritical'. Now that the tide of high
theory has passed, and criticality has been left desiccated, high
on the salty shores of architectural discourse, it is the post-critical
that has come scuttling forth to scavenge, and to take its place.
In the present furore that surrounds this new, post-eritical
condition, it is possible to observe several important confusions
about what the 'post-eritical' might actually be, and what it might
mean. It is at once a generational wrangle among American
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architecture academics, a trans-Atlantic misunderstanding as to
the nature of political activity in architecture, and (arguably) it
apes the current 'post-theory' debate in the wider world of cultural
theory. Some of these confusions can be cut through by asking
a relatively simple question, which will form the linking thread in
this essay: if architecture has become post-eritical, what becomes
of architectural criticism? More specifically, what changes in
the relation between historiography, current architectural practice,
and written architectural criticism?
Criticality, Post-Criticality, and Architectural Criticism
In this paper we will argue that one of the problems of critical
architecture was that it tended to hollow out written criticism.
The excitement in architectural discourse over the last decades
has been a dance between 'theory' and design, where history
has provided the music. Design has asserted the theoretical
content and utility of practice, while partnered with arabesques
of theoretical writing. In the meantime, written criticism has come
to look rather dowdy. Not only does criticism have the age-old
perceptions of bias and timidity, but new problems have also
emerged in the era of criticality. If critical architecture in theory
and practice claims to move directly from analysis to creation,
then the actual protocols of written criticism, those of appraisal
and judgement, seem not only outdated but an actual impediment
to 'criticality'. Against such views we argue that criticism is the
place where a concrete, disciplinary conception of architecture,
such as that held by most practicing architects, meetswith the
historical-aesthetic conception of the specialist critic. Criticism is
the interface between a whole series of oppositions - between
architectural culture and architectural practice, the academy
and the industry, the discipline and the operation of architecture,
the history of past practice, its inflection in the present, and its
projection into the future. We are not proposing that criticism is
the foundation of critical thinking in architecture: theory, history,
architectural design and critical writing are all kinds of practice
that have the potential to account for and act on the relations
of architecture, thought and the actuality of the world. But perhaps
it is timely to think that writers of criticism are not short-sighted
historians; nor does the necessary externality of criticism deny the
critical potential imminent in architectural works. The judgement
of the critic is not the problem, nor is it final in the senseof a
final authority. The making of a judgement is crucial in opening
architectural criticism to an operative role in architectural practice.
Further to this, we argue that the activity of aesthetic judgement is
itself historiographic - the critic as judge has recourse to a whole
body of law and precedent in the form of the architectural canon,
which itself is made up of a consensus of past critical [udqement.'
This must be judgement without operation in and of itself-
it is an activity that prepares or readies criticism to be taken up
by architects. Criticism is thus made available or opened for
operation, but the judge is not an operator.
Before returning to the trajectory of this rather polemical
argument, it will be useful here to discuss the relative positions in
the critical/post-critical stand-off. An excellent summary of the
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debate so far has been made by George Baird in his essay
'''Criticality'' and ItsDiscontents', where he identifies the principal
texts and protagonists of this new polemic, all of whom, not
incidentally, are based in North American ivy-league universitles."
. Baird singles out Robert Somal and Sarah Whiting's essay
'Notes Around the Doppler Effect and Other Moods of Modern-
ism' in particular, as a key text in the larger ideological shift.6
Somal and Whiting argue that for the past twenty years in
architecture, 'disciplinarity has been absorbed and exhausted by
the project of criticality'. They set out thus 'to provide an alterna-
tive to the now dominant paradigm of criticality, an alternative
that [they characterise] as projective.'7
A little earlier, in the last issueof Assemblage in 2000,
the generation gap among the Americans had already become
wonderfully clear, when Eisenman defended and restated the
position of the journal through the idea that criticism directed at
the autonomous state of architecture could and should be
generative.s Against this, Somol wrote that 'criticism isn't neces-
sary', that it had become something of an industry, and that it
was no longer 'fun'. Somol then went on, with Whiting, to devel-
op the concept of 'projective' practice, which would look forward
without the dead weight of the critical. This projective architec-
tural practice would be instrumental, pragmatic, performative,
contingent, and focused upon 'the effects and exchanges of
architecture's inherent multiplicities: material, program, writing,
atmosphere, form, technologies, economics, etc.'.? It would be
'linked to the diagrammatic, the atmospheric and cool perform-
ance' in contrast to criticality's link with 'the indexical, the
dialectical and hot representation' .10 Naturally the position drew
fire, such as the following response from Cynthia Davidson:
In my reading at least, the idea of the postcritical and the idea
of the projective practice as currently elaborated by Somol,
Whiting, [and others] abandon, rather frivolously, the hard-
fought achievements in the field that I most cherish and
have worked hard to advance: criticality, theoretical depth,
and resistance to the banalities of consumer culture. 11
The sore point in all this seemsto be politics, and the question
of whether architecture has a political role, or indeed any political
power or agency at all. The' critical' position assumeswhat
Whiting and Somol call an index of the political, through which
architectural form can represent political circumstances such as
Davidson's 'consumer culture' and act upon it in architecture,
as a model for actual action in the world. The post-eritics are right
to debunk such magical politics, but then they, too, are unwilling
to give up the authority of political action through architecture.
Their aim is not to abandon criticism as such, but rather the way
that it has been (literally) formalised and formulated in the critical
architecture project. According to Jeffery Kipnis, we should now
follow Somol and Whiting to a Deleuzian politics of 'sensations
rather than negations' .12 Kipnis setsout some of the complexity of
the two opposed positions, but his quite subtle and nuanced
account of the issues is outweighed by the power of this essay's
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ironically reductive title: 'Is Resistance Futile?' In many ways this is
indeed the burning question - if critical architecture was ultimately
unsuccessful in 'resisting' the predations of consumer culture,
is it important that it tried anyway? Or should current architecture
take a lesson from this failure, and give up on resistance as a
waste of time and effort? The issue here is clearly not whether the
specific formalist 'critical architecture' of Eisenman and others has
been set aside, but whether a critical comportment that has been
basic to art for much of the twentieth century is no longer relevant.
There is also an aspect of geopolitics in all this. Arguments
against ascesis and for facility, tend to be conflated with the' soft
power' of American popular culture, and a widening transatlantic
divide, and there was something of this mood in the recent
Critical Architecture conference at the Bartlett in London." This is
unfortunate, as it ignores the sophistication and pertinence of
the American debate, but it also reveals something of an uncom-
fortable truth. The mixture of Marxism and post-structuralism
that seems to provide a common set of concepts to architectural
theory, is in fact quite specific to particular institutions and groups.
Language, context and the sequence of translation mean that the
'critical architecture' that is under critique by Somol and Whiting
might not be accepted or even recognised in Europe. It comes
from Fredric Jameson's reading of Manfredo Tafuri with Antonio
Gramsci, George Baird's semiotics, K. Michael Hay's uptake of
Frankfurt School critical theory, the agendas of the journals
Oppositions and Assemblage, and so on. In short, there still is
no 'architectural theory' that we can adequately separate from the
positions it tokens in the real politics of particular institutions.
The harsh question we might then ask is 'was this all that "theory"
ever was?'
Theory after Theory
There have always been complaints that architectural theory was
gratuitously 'difficult', unproductive, and in fact served particular
institutional agendas of the theorists. It is perhaps timely to
consider this proposition on the basis of a history of architectural
theory, but this is also where a further source of potential
confusion lies. An apprehension of the stifling effects of theory is
not restricted to architecture alone. Pretty much the same things
are currently being said in literary and cultural studies, in history,
in science studies. In fact the hottest theory of the moment is
'post-theory': Ian Hackings's The Social Construction of What?
Terry Eagleton's After Theory, Payne and Schad's collection life.
after. theory and volume 30 of Critical Inquiry are just a few
examples of what is becoming a whole new genre of theoretical
writing. Naturally one should be sceptical of the post-eritical in
architecture in the light of such intellectual fashions, but what
if there is a degree of truth here? What if we really have reached
a 'tipping point', to use the currently fashionable term? The issue
then would not be the truth or effectivity of 'theory' as such, but
what actually happened to it in the long frame of the development
of concepts and the shorter frame of their institutional uptake.
There is much to agree with in Bruno Latour's recent broad analy-
sis, which lends weight to the post-eritical position in architecture;
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in his brilliant essay 'Why has Critique run out of Steornj",
Latour draws a connection between the rampant proliferation
of deconstructive critique, and its mutation into populist
conspiracy theory. He writes that
While the Enlightenment profited largely from the disposition of
a very powerful descriptive tool, that of matters of fact, which
were excellent for debunking quite a lot of beliefs, powers, and
illusions, it found itself totally disarmed once matters of fact, in
turn, were eaten up by the same debunking impetus. After that,
the lights of the Enlightenment were slowly turned off, and some
sort of darkness appears to have fallen on cornpuses.!"
In Latour's conception, the critical apparatus is now so wide-
spread, and so deftly wielded, that it can be effectively turned
against any object in the world, including itself, in a way that is
very difficult to refute or refuse. This constant undermining and
installing of doubt, this revelation of false idols, only ever leads to
their simple replacement with others equally false. 15 This substitu-
tion is a sleight of hand. It is very often an alibi for the simple
exchange of one mythology for another, in which the real and
urgent matters, about which we should all be critical, are lost or
passed over. A significant aspect of critical architecture was that it
was post-humanist, in the sense that buildings were not measured
against an ideal of human satisfaction but rather against history.
Critical buildings were intended as historiographic devices,
reading machines that actively demonstrated their own historicity.
Buildings that are 'critical' supposedly put you in concrete rather
than idealised relations to history, give you a method and an
approach to the past. A critical building will not only be under-
stood, but felt, and this disjunction of affect and intellect will open
the historicity of the present more powerfully than a book, or so
the story goes. In fact, to follow Latour's terms, the debunking of
essentialist notions of the human experience of architecture
merely becomes the sleight of hand in which 'criticality' takes its
place as the privileged outside of history, becomes a value rather
than an action. This is also a matter of comportment; we have
learnt very effectively to unpick, but we have been lesssuccessful
in learning how to stitch. This is also Somol and Whiting's posi-
tion, more specifically in relation to architecture: that the critical
comportment induces a kind of paralysis, where the counter-
arguments and reasons for not doing something are always so
strong and evident that they mitigate against anyone ever taking
any action at all. This is a key element of their projective architec-
ture - it is predicated on action, on casting a line forward into the
future, but in a 'relaxed' and 'easy' fashion that is not too uptight
about the implications and repercussions.
A similar argument about the present universality of the critical
attitude is made by John Whiteman, who claims that criticism
is both ubiquitous within, and characteristic of, our modernity.
Following Immanuel Kant's pronouncement that 'our age is,
in every sense of the word, the age of criticism, and everything
must submit to it', Whiteman argues that criticism has become a
'way of life' in modern Western societies.
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Truth is what can stand up in the howling gales of criticism.
Our age is one of deep suspicion in which everything must be
questioned if it is to be substantiated. Truth for us is an unmask-
ing, a laying bare ... We cannot accept the world as it is
immediately given to us through 'ordinary' words and images,
and instead look for justification behind the veil of deception. 16
Such circumstances lead away from a commitment to the actual
world and a retreat into 'the general and abstract as harbours of
unassailable legitimation and sophistication'. In the specific
context of architectural criticism, this means a diffusion of attention
away from the specific architectural object. But here it is possible
to employ Whiteman's work further, to repeat the distinction
between criticality, as an attitude and general architectural
comportment, and the far more specific activity of written architec-
tural crificism." Somol and Whiting may well be correct about
the paralysis inherent in attempts to make architecture itself into
built critique, but this only serves to underscore our argument
about the too-close coupling of critique and practice within
criticality. This is not to say that architectural criticism is not also
nihilistic, or at least not necessarily. 18But the very distinction
between criticism and architectural practice here becomes crucial.
The vast majority of architectural criticism is written, and therefore
enacted in a medium which is different from that of its objects:
it is always a translation and a transcription into language, and it
is thus impossible to speak of architectural criticism without also
speaking of literary technique, rhetoric, and the persona of the
critic as author. As Pattabi Raman and Richard Coyne have noted,
this already imbues architectural criticism with a certain semantic
instability; 'the restlessnessof the critic already resides in the
restlessnessof language.'19 But it is precisely the gap, this caesura
between built presentation and written representation, which
allows architectural criticism to take a productive role. Architec-
tural criticism has many modes and processes, and the quite
distinct activities of description, analysis, exposition, explanation,
interpretation, comparison, historicisation, and judgement each
have a role to play. Of all these, it is judgement which locates and
holds a still point within the swirling mists of generalised cultural
critique, and the equally endless wanderings of architectural
exegesis. The role of the critic is to make a strong judgement
about a building, which demands agreement or disagreement,
but which does not simply open onto infinite further interpretation.
Operative criticism is, at base, an instruction. It demands that
architects and the public 'admire this', 'build like this', 'value this'.
It is certainly possible to disagree with such judgemental impera-
tives, to refuse or to fight them, but this very process is itself the
operation and value of criticism. As Miriam Gusevich has written:
Criticism is riskier than commentary. It is willing to judge and
to condemn, to stake out and substantiate a particular position.
Serious criticism is not sheer negativity; it is the careful and
thoughtful disclosure of dimensions that might otherwise elude
us.... It is also self-reflective, since it recognises that to identify
a building ... as worthy of discussion implicitly offers it as a
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potential candidate to the canon, and criticism takes the
responsibility to substantiate its judgement.2o
In the present politics of institutions, then, it seems as if a flowering
of written architectural criticism will be possible in the space
left by the withering of 'critical practice'. Having identified some
of the threads in the knot of post-eritical architecture, let us
try to unpick it, or at least loosen it a little. Davidson's attack and
Kipnis's defence of Somol and Whiting both occur in issue
number 5 of the journal Log; Davidson is the journal's editor,
Somol and Whiting the issue's guest editors. Log is perhaps the
most interesting new architecture journal and, apart from the
excitement of the editorial spat in number 5, this is for the simplest
of reasons: because it is a journal that still values architectural
criticism. What is significant here is firstly, a displacement, and
secondly, an opening onto a longer vista of intellectual history.
Judgement and the Judge
Latour enjoins us to see the moment of critique in a larger histori-
cal frame, and so it is apposite to ask why it is that critical practice
and the practice of criticism have seemed so opposed in recent
times. The answer to this lies with the figure of the judge. The
conceptual advantage that critical architecture has is that it places
criticism in practice and thus in the concrete present rather than in
a judge who then requires some authority to stand outside the
present. We could put all the preceding discussion the other way
around and state that 'critical practice' and 'critical historiog-
raphy' mark an absence, a failure to agree on the conditions
and criteria for judging the merit of buildings. The post-critical
might thus be seen as returning to a problem not only of the late
twentieth century, but one that goes back to the original Critique
of Judqement." Kant's critique removed the grounds by which
empirical aesthetics might have acted to justify and naturalise
aristocratic taste, but have we gone too far in thinking that every
judgement of taste must be uncritical if it does not have the
strictures of history and praxis? What in the end is uncritical in
liking buildings?
The instability of the frame and terms of reference through
which architecture should be judged has often been noted.
Writing in 1914, Geoffrey Scott fell back on the old Vitruvian
triad of commodity, firmness and delight, noting that 'between
these three values the criticism of architecture has insecurely
wavered, not always distinguishing clearly between them,
seldom attempting any statement of the relation they bear to one
another, never pursuing to their conclusion the consequences
which they involve. It has leaned now this way and now that, and
struck between these incommensurable virtues, at different points,
its arbitrary balance.'22 More pessimistic authors have, when
faced with this same uncertainty, opted for a reductive, objectivist
or strictly technical approach, William H. Hayes, for instance,
argues that 'the best that we can do now is to be radically empiri-
cal, that means that only by living with a building can we deter-
mine its performance and that any general claims beyond that
are no more than and no less than inductions from experience.'23
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But given the mixed nature of architectural practice itself,
any practicing architectural critic soon realises that he or she
must define and assert the specific frame of reference that
will be brought to bear on a given building, whether this frame is
functionalist, normative, phenomenological, formalist, aesthetic,
sociological, or one of any number of other possibilities. The key
point here is that the very selection of the set of critical tools to
be employed on a specific building is itself historiographic-
it is informed and determined by history as much as it is an active
writing into history. 24
Architectural history has often been taken to be the authority for
judgement, and critical judgement a mode of historical analysis.
By comparing buildings across history the critic can see what
merits in a building escape historical determination. The problems
with this position are well explained and then reorganised by
Tafuri. He argues that the role of the critic is not that of judging
whether buildings are good or bad, pleasing or displeasing, but
where and how they fit into history - whether they are reactionary
or regressive, whether they contribute or stand in the way of
history. As opposed to electing some person to decide what
architecture should be, it seemsmodest to make history the judge
of architectural merit (although this requires history to be a
unity visible to historians and thus another kind of metaphysic).
Tafuri has no place for criticism outside history, and argues that
there are only two acceptable methods of criticism - constructivist
image juxtaposition and typological urbanism, both of which
are modes of practice. Similarly, what the historian must not be
is operative, history must be objective, or at least true to itself.
In these terms the fault of the operative historian, such as Sigfried
Giedion for example, was that he judged present practice as a
critic, and then searched for historical precedents for the favoured
works. For Tafuri, criticism is a moment of mutual recognition
between the unreflected timeliness of an architectural practice and
the writing of history. A second way of avoiding the clash of
history and judgement is more extreme, and sees history as well
as judgement eaten by critical practice. Here history has no telos
as it has for Giedion or Tafuri, and is limited to precedent and
the role of revealing and making transmissible the embodied
knowledge of the discipline. In such a scenario, architects of the
late 1940's did not know how 'critical' LeCorbusier actually was,
and the historical skills of Colin Rowe were required to dig the
Villa Foscari out of history and to make it available on the same
terms as the Villa Stein." Here again, judgement lies in the act of
architectural practice and it does not even require the recognition
of a historian, but only a kind of ekphrasis or ritual praise that
compares it with precedent."
Aesthetic Judgement and Architectural Disciplinarity
What has been unspeakable for the whole period of critical
architecture is aesthetic judgement. This is for reasons that were
true across the spectrum of cultural discourse. On the one hand,
there was (and still is) the possibility that empirical psychology
might show that much of cultural preference is not cultural at
all but 'hard-wired' in the brain, perhaps as a result of so many
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accidents of human evolution. On the other, there was (and still is]
the powerful, good-old-days critique of ideology such as that
of John Berger and more systematically Pierre Bourdieu, which
showed that aesthetic preferences are not only learnt, but actively
propagated to naturalise social inequality. 27(And for those who
are strong social constructivists, psychological aesthetics is still in
on this plot.] But there remains a limit to how much one can
disbelieve in the sensesand believe in buildings as something
specific, and not as indifferent instances of what might have been
thought, drawn or imagined. Gradually, over the last decade,
issuesof sense and affect have re-emerged in architecture, largely,
strangely, through the work of Gilles Deleuze, whose empiricism is
undeniable even to those who quote him like poetry. The more
specific reason for opposing aesthetics as the basis of architec-
tural judgement is the general incompatibility of aesthetics with a
concept of disciplines of art making, such as architecture.
If, as Kant thought, there is the possibility of pure judgement of
one's sensory experience, then there is no space for a disciplinary
aesthetic for architecture in particular. There are simply judge-
ments of sensewhich every person, architect or not, makes.
These might tend to an ideal that may be more or less knowable,
but knowing it really doesn't make much difference except
at some higher level of resonance between faculties of mind.
Moreover, such aesthetic sensewould be no help to architects,
since the basis for actual, everyday architectural practice is the
disciplinary one of precedent - what architects know is what other
architects did. On this basis, it is possible to say that things are
'true' or 'false' to the discipline. This is only aesthetic in the
last instance, namely buildings are beautiful if they have been
hallowed by reference and used as precedent, therefore a lot of
people must have liked them. Here, sense is unknowable except
by referring it to concepts. Of course Kant's position is famously
extreme and one of the ways that the post-critics, particularly
Somol, go post-critical is to weaken the meaning of aesthetics.
Here again, the move does not originate in architecture but with
the post-post-modern critic of art and culture Dave Hickey, whose
laconic prose and ideas are a clear model for being less 'critical'
as a path back to practical criticism."
Like Hickey, Somol and Whiting's flippant language and
irreverence toward theory is the rhetorical outcome of a position
on aesthetics that opposes 'those who assume that anything that
works must be facile'.29 Perhaps, as with Hickey, this is a genuine
interest in what used to be called pop, but the facile is here not so
much a value, as a blunt weapon to beat up romanticism. Much
of what is dis-likable about high theory is its cult of persons and of
the persona of the theorist, which, as Ian Hunter has shown,
has its own institutional history in the teaching of metaphysics in
universities, as it has slowly evolved since the seventeenth
century." Sometime in the late eighteenth century, the figure of
the metaphysician and that of the person of cultivated aesthetical
judgement joined together, at which time aesthetical feeling,
and/or the ability to analyse it, became something rare, difficult,
and served to give a high profile to the individual judge. But
for Hickey, or (before all this] David Hume, aesthetical feeling is
27
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not uncommon or distinguishing at all, it is a simple matter of
relating to things in the world, something commonplace, trivial,
and easy, if nonetheless hard to account for and to reconcile."
Whether one sees the post-<:riticalas an innovation or as a
memory of a pre-hyper-eritical time, the point is that such an
account has aesthetic feeling as being already there, rather than
being a state to be attained through the long difficult labours and
ascesis of theory. This dumb move derails a long-held opposition
between political and aesthetic critique: if you subscribe to a
romantic/aesthetic view of architecture, then a social constructiv-
ist critique, dedicated to constant uncovering social constructions
and unmasking politics, would be mutually exclusive from an
aesthetic critique, which is always implicitly about beauty. These
are exclusive if you think that beauty is transcendent and rare and
important. But just imagine that you didn't, that you had aban-
doned a romanticist idea of beauty and aesthetics, and you had
an idea of beauty as trivial and commonplace: then you could
talk about the aesthetics and the social constructions together.
The benefit would be that in the process of such a 'weak', pluralist
opprooch, one could also dramatically deflate the hubris of
criticism and make it possible to enact without an authority outside
of itself. It is precisely such an approach to architectural criticism
that we would advocate.
The Historiographic Taskof the Architectural Critic
The critic stands at the hinge between past and future, and his or
her task is to locate and reveal discrepancies between what
architecture has been, and what it is now. like history, criticism is
retrospective I and acts to conceptualise and make transmissible
that which has been lived, octed, built. Justas historiography is
constantly rewriting and reframing the past, criticism is constantly
rewriting architectural practice. The architectural critic has a
concept of discipline that is different from the actual profession
and actual practice at any given time. In selecting and curating
those projects that will be written into the historical record, the
historian is always a critic, whether explicitly or not. Criticism can
also be historical; we might still read John Ruskin'scriticism today,
not just as evidence of the ideas of the time, but to seewhich
parts are still useful and which have become simply history. It is
ultimately architectural criticism, or at least a consensusof critical
judgements made by historians, that serves to formulate an
architectural canon. But this is a heavy weight that leaves criticism
as a proxy for the grey eminence of history and with no authority
of its own. If criticism is to advance and provide tangible guid-
ance to architectural practice. then it must engage in the imme-
diacy of feeling and of aesthetic judgement. Only in this way can
criticism be opened and rendered available for architectural
operation - so that practice can project free of the history that it
might become.
Of course, while fighting for its own criterion, criticism cannot
and should not relinquish its historiographic role. This is what
stops it from being subsumed into practice, with all the confusion
and discomfort that is familiar to critics and architects alike. In this
sensei we would agree with Cornel West who, already in 1991,
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identified an 'intellectual crisis in architectural criticism', from
which a 'theory-laden historiography' was a way out: 'The future
of architectural criticism rests on the development of a refined
and a revisionist architectural historiography that creatively fuses
social histories of architectural practices and social histories of
technology, in light of sophisticated interpretations of the present
cultural crisis. This historiography must be informed by the current
theoretical debates in the larger discourse of cultural criticism.'32
The complex, layered relation between criticism and practice
at best contributes directly to architectural practice and at worst
is parasitical and ineffective. It is not always clear what architects
want from criticism, and why and for whom critics are actually
writing. This also bears on the question of when architectural
criticism is useful to architecture - its temporality as well as its
historicity. A further complication of criticism is that the doctrine of
Kantian disinterest makes the requirement for objectivity in
criticism so high; the critic, in this conception, must be especially
disinterested, and there is a wide-spread belief that architectural
criticism is not adequately objective because it is tainted by
commercial bias. Further to this is the belief that criticism is
insufficiently rigorous or 'hard' in its judgements, it is too polite,
too sycophantic, obsessed with glamour photography, unduly
attracted by novelty and spectacle, complicit in the architectural
'star system', vague or simply incorrect in its criteria for judge-
ment, and overly predicated on formal concerns. All of this has
contributed to a wide-spread and continuing belief that architec-
tural criticism is in a state of unremitting crisia."
Even given all these complications, architectural criticism is still
crucial and indispensable to architecture. It has a very specific
utility, albeit one with a complex temporal lag. Instrumentality and
temporality are ambiguously linked in architectural criticism - it
almost always happens after the fact, when the building (whether
good or not] is a fait accompli. In this sensearchitectural criticism
has a temporality of its own, of the time of its reception, which
differs from that of history, but which also becomes historical
because of the time of construction. The criticism of film is in the
'now' of the screening while what architectural critics do is like
criticism published after the Filmhas closed at the cinema, which is
to say the history of cinema. The use of criticism (other than
history] thus lies in assisting architects to know where this work fits
within history, and in making recommendations for future architec-
tural practice. But this utility bears fruit only after a substantial lag,
as architects enact its findings in their next buildings. The tempo-
rality of architectural criticism thus covers a greater span than
almost any other type of criticism, not only because of the ancient-
nessof architecture as an art, but also because current critique
is projected into, and has its efficacy in the future. This also leaves
the architectural critic in a difficult position - in the interests of
being productive, there seems little point in railing against some-
thing that is already done and Finished, in arguing that it shouldn't
ever have been built. There is, of course, a value in seeing such
works as warnings and correctives, an example of what to avoid
in the future, just as good work should be emulated. But there
is also a strong argument that architectural criticism should
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concern itself with unbuilt schemes, with drawings and ideas and
competitions, because it is there that it has the potential to make a
direct effect on design outcomes in the world.
There is no question that architectural criticism contributes
significantly to a lively and intellectual architectural culture, that
it is a tangible way in which the history and theory of architecture
can be located in architectural practice and architectural objects,
and even that it can be a valuable tool in architectural education -
in the production of reflexive, informed, and discerning gradu-
ates. But all of this is empty if the practice of architectural criticism
does not ultimately make a contribution to architecture as both
discipline and a discourse. So how, why, when, and for whom is
architectural criticism useful? More particularly, what do architects
want from architectural criticism, and why? Often enough,
these questions are not posed, let alone answered. But they are
crucial to an understanding of the role and efficacy of criticism
within architectural culture, and to a defence against its traps:
the meaningless, the banal, the parasitic, the ineffectual. In the
possibility of a healthy and robust architectural criticism, with a
strong concept of what architecture is and should be, lies the
possible future hope for political engagement between architec-
ture and the world. Perhaps in this way, at some time in the future,
architecture may be able to properly take up the broader political
role that both the critical and post-critical positions advocate,
each in their own way. It is through direct, operative criticism that
the hidden or unrealised aims of critical practice might actually
and eventually emerge.
In the past few years it might seem that there is a judgment
to be made. Does one see or not see a historical fissure opening
around the term 'critical'? Is this situation real or hysterical?
Is it to be applauded or regretted? We have argued that there
is no 'critical architecture' in general and these questions can only
be answered in the choices confronted in practice. But it is no
paradox that these questions are clearest in the contingencies,
the messy temporality, the accounting for feelings, the provisional
finality of judgement, that is, the practice of criticism.
